INTRODUCTION
Until recently, the "Page One" meeting was a newspaper ritual. 1 Top brass gathered around a conference room table to decide what the news of the day was. Editors of political, metro, features, and sports sections pitched stories to the editor in chief, managing editor, and each other. They questioned and debated.
2 Skepticism abounded. When it was all over, section editors had marching orders for their reporters, and everyone knew what would appear on page A1. When it was done right, the editors around the table had made decisions based on their collective news sense-the product of their journalistic training, experience, and professional ethics. The stories that survived the gauntlet had been deemed newsworthy. 3 These days, editorial meetings still happen, and the questioning and debating continue. 4 But the emphasis has shifted. Given that news is far more often consumed on phones than broadsheets of newsprint, the "Page One" label has fallen into disuse.
5 At today's meeting, editors needing to generate sufficient reader traffic to websites are often more concerned with clicks and "engagement" than with what will appear on A1. Moreover, the editors in that meeting no longer dictate to the same degree what news we actually read. That determination is ever more in the hands of computer engineers in Silicon Valley. These engineers design and continually recalibrate the algorithms that populate the
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[Vol. 106:69 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL increasingly outdated assumption that an institutional press has necessarily acted according to a set of professional guidelines and ethics. It is becoming a relic of a time in the not-so-distant past when the Fourth Estate served as both generator and distributor of content-a time when it had a near monopoly on the information gatekeeper role. Today, a rift is growing between how the press generates news and how the courts seem to assume this task is accomplished. Courts need to better understand the forces at work behind what we are consuming as news and adjust their decision making accordingly. In doing this, if we truly want to give heft to the privacy torts as they now exist, courts may need to play the role they have assiduously avoided-the role of editor.
This Article proposes that instead of exercising deference to the press as a reflex and dismissing cases against the media at an early stage, the law should place a burden on media defendants. They would need to prove two things. First, media defendants would need to show they engaged in the process the courts have typically assumed has occurred-assessing newsworthiness before deciding to publish. Second, given that the First Amendment provides the theoretical underpinning for the newsworthiness defense, media defendants would need to demonstrate the publication of the allegedly private fact had First Amendment value-for example, a dialogue-building or watchdog function. 18 If a media defendant could not offer up this proof, newsworthiness would not (as often happens now) be decided as a matter of law. 19 Instead, the judge or jury, acting as fact-finders, would develop the record so they could be positioned to make well-reasoned decisions regarding newsworthiness. In this way, the deliberative process that was once occurring robustly in newsrooms could now happen in the litigation process. A more intricate process may be able to serve in some way as a surrogate for the Page One editorial meetings of the past. As part of this process, courts should develop a set of factors to help them decide whether to label as legitimately newsworthy the news that is published. Finally, courts should welcome the help of journalists as experts in invasion-ofprivacy cases to better understand and assess whether a news organization exercised editorial decision making in publishing. Moreover, the press's participation in the process would help prevent the newsworthiness decision from becoming a referendum on the bounds of public taste.
In proposing these solutions, there are certain things this Article is not doing. It avoids making normative judgments about the quality of journalism and news century member of the British House of Commons, and is distinguishable from the other estates, "Lords Spiritual, Lords Temporal, and Commons, which have in modern times been subsumed into one: the government"). In this Article, the terms media, press, and Fourth Estate are used interchangeably.
18 [n] early all of the reported cases" that had considered the newsworthiness exception to New York's right of privacy law "have been decided as a matter of law" on pre-trial motions).
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73 MAKING NEWS: BALANCING NEWSWORTHINESS AND PRIVACY today. Rather, it aims to begin to realign privacy-law doctrine to the reality of today's news business. It is also not intended to be a full-throated defense of stronger privacy protections at the expense of the First Amendment. 20 Rather, it accepts as a baseline that we, as a society, have determined there should be some balance between the two and that we have done a poor job of making this a reality. When it comes to the press, courts' resistance to balancing has come at the expense of those who claim their privacy has been violated. Today, this position is increasingly indefensible. If we want to preserve the public disclosure of private facts tort, there necessarily must be some balancing, and courts need methods for engaging in it. This Article offers some options.
It proceeds in four parts. Part I provides background on the longstanding tension between privacy rights on the one hand and First Amendment rights on the other, with a focus on cases involving the media. In trying to balance the two, courts have repeatedly come down in favor of the press. In doing so, courts have spoken reverently of the editorial process and editorial discretion. Part II gives an overview of the dramatic shift that is underway in how news is distributed and consumed and what we perceive of as news. This includes a discussion of the dissonance between the decision-making processes of engineers, coders, and designers on one hand and journalists on the other. Part III addresses the impact of the shift in the role of information gatekeeper from journalists to engineers, and how platforms and algorithms are not simply funneling news to us, but changing the very nature of what journalists produce. Finally, in Part IV, this Article argues that such broad deference, based on an assumption that news is generally the product of journalists exercising news judgment, is less warranted than it once was. It reviews some changes that scholars have proposed to the public disclosure of private facts tort, including redefining newsworthiness. It then argues that given the inherent slipperiness of newsworthiness, effort may be better spent trying to supplement the loss of editorial discretion with a more robust litigation process, one that would encourage a more careful weighing of privacy and free speech concerns.
I. PRIVACY V. FIRST AMENDMENT: THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEFERENCE TO THE PRESS
The right to privacy has always risked offending the First Amendment. When in 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis published their classic article The Right to Privacy and called for recognition of the right, they recognized the tension between the right to speak and the "right to be let alone. 
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[Vol. 106:69 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL between privacy and free speech a "head-on collision" that had transitioned to a "slow evolution of a compromise." 22 Today, that compromise is still uneasy. Courts continue to struggle with the concept of newsworthiness, which sits at the crossroads of privacy and the First Amendment, in essence trying to keep the former from violating the latter. 23 The beneficiary of that struggle, if there is one, has been the press. 24 In case after case involving the media, courts have struck the balance between privacy and the First Amendment in favor of the press, and in doing so have sweepingly deferred to the Fourth Estate. 25 
A. WARREN, BRANDEIS, PROSSER, AND THE EVOLUTION OF NEWSWORTHINESS
The media was the catalyst for privacy torts. 26 Warren and Brandeis's The Right to Privacy could well be described as a diatribe against the media. 27 In it, they spoke of the "evil of the invasion of privacy by the newspapers" into "the sacred precincts of private and domestic life." 28 Venom practically seeping from the page, they added,
The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, 23. The public disclosure of private facts tort requires "publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another" that "would be highly offensive to a reasonable person" and "is not of legitimate concern to the public." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (emphasis added). Defamation, too, involves an assessment of the news value of speech, although not as explicitly. A defamatory statement is one published about the plaintiff when the defendant acted either negligently (plaintiff is a private figure) or with actual malice (plaintiff is a public figure). Where newsworthiness inserts itself into the analysis is as a defense. Although it only exists in a limited number of jurisdictions, the neutral reportage privilege can protect a journalist who publishes another person's defamatory statement. See, e.g., Edwards v. Nat'l Audubon Soc., 556 F.2d 113, 120-22 (2d Cir. 1977); see also Neutral Report Privilege, DIG. MEDIA LAW PROJECT, http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/neutralreport-privilege [https://perma.cc/9NMW-5GZU] (noting that the neutral reportage privilege has not been widely adopted). Similarly, the fair report privilege can be employed when a journalist fairly and accurately conveys information from an official public document or statement on a matter of public concern. Fair Report Privilege, DIG. MEDIA L. PROJECT Warren and Brandeis concluded that there was "no doubt" of the desirability and necessity for protection from the media.
30
Despite their vitriol for the press, Warren and Brandeis also recognized the need for protecting it. Any privacy right, they said, necessarily had to be "limited."
31 Carving out space for the First Amendment was critical, and they indicated that liability for an invasion of privacy would not arise where the media was reporting on a "subject of legitimate interest" to citizens.
32 Yet, as to where to draw the line between privacy and the First Amendment-in other words, how to define a "subject of legitimate interest" or "newsworthiness"-they readily conceded that they had no "wholly accurate or exhaustive definition."
33 Really, they had nothing more than a rough sketch. On one side of the line fell "private" things, such as "private life, habits, acts and relations of an individual," and on the other fell "public" things such as "fitness for a public office." 34 Beyond that, as Warren and Brandeis suggested, any rule establishing liability for invasion of privacy had to have "elasticity" to it.
35
Seventy years later, when William L. Prosser wrote Privacy, journalism had changed dramatically. 36 It was no longer driven primarily by bias and shock value. Instead, journalism had been professionalized, and objectivity and independence were institutional values. 37 Public perception of journalists had correspondingly improved. 38 Perhaps it is unsurprising then that Prosser's conception of newsworthiness was far broader than that of Warren and Brandeis. 39 Prosser defined news as "includ[ing] all events and items of information which are out of the ordinary humdrum routine, and which have 'that indefinable quality of 29 Although this definition is certainly easier to apply than that of Warren and Brandeis (virtually everything falls within it), it still seems far from finished. To call news "indefinable" and in the eye of the beholder fails in the same way Justice Potter Stewart's definition of "hard-core pornography" did. 41 Prosser went on, however, to narrow his definition in an important way. News was not, he said, just what any observer believed it to be. News was what a journalist believed it to be. He wrote: "To a very great extent the press, with its experience or instinct as to what its readers will want, has succeeded in making its own definition of news. A glance at any morning newspaper will sufficiently indicate the content of the term." 42 While Prosser's Privacy was influential, what secured the importance of this definition going forward (and, correspondingly, the media's own role in shaping the definition) was its incorporation seven years later in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, for which Prosser was the Reporter. 43 In its comments, the Restatement defines "news," saying: "Included within the scope of legitimate public concern are matters of the kind customarily regarded as 'news.' To a considerable extent, in accordance with the mores of the community, the publishers and broadcasters have themselves defined the term, as a glance at any morning paper will confirm." 44 Now, according to the most influential treatise on the subject, newsworthiness was what the press said it was.
B. NEWSWORTHINESS AND THE COURTS' DEFERENCE TO THE EDITORIAL PROCESS As academics were envisioning and then describing the state of tort law, legislatures and courts were developing it. During the first half of the twentieth century numerous jurisdictions adopted right of privacy statutes, and courts crafted a common law of privacy. It was inevitable that these courts, including the Supreme Court, would confront the collision of privacy and First Amendment rights, and the courts have addressed this tension several times since the 1960s. 45 In these cases, time after time, courts have come down heavily on the side of speech. 46 54 In that case, the Court weighed the privacy of a family who had been taken hostage by escaped convicts against the right of Life Magazine to publish a story that portrayed (falsely, according to plaintiff) the hostage situation. 55 In coming down on the side of the First Amendment, the Court invoked the Press Clause specifically when it wrote: "Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized community. [b] oth the history and language of the First Amendment support the view that the press must be left free to publish news, whatever the source, without censorship, injunctions, or prior restraints." Id. at 717 (Black, J., concurring). Further describing the hands-off approach that government should exercise toward the press, Justice Black wrote:
In the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the free press the protection it must have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy. The press was to serve the governed, not the governors. The Government's power to censor the press was abolished so that the press would remain forever free to censure the Government.
Id.
54 59 In Cox, the father of a rape-murder victim sued for invasion of his right to privacy after the media plaintiff identified his daughter during its coverage of the trial of the alleged rapists. 60 In Florida Star, a rape victim sued a newspaper for publishing her name in violation of its own internal policy against publishing the names of sexual offense victims. 61 In both cases, the Court spoke of the need to trust the press. In Cox, it wrote that "reliance must rest upon the judgment of those who decide what to publish or broadcast." 62 This sentiment was so important that fourteen years later in Florida Star, the Court repeated it verbatim. 63 These statements were indicative of the Court's belief that the press was to be trusted and allowed to do its important job.
In the broad range of tort cases against the press, the Court has consistently reasoned that it is deferring not simply to the press as an institution and the role it plays in democracy, but to the editorial process that it exercises. The suggestion is that judges feel comfortable deferring to the press because of the press's expertise in determining newsworthiness. Take, for example, Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo. 64 In siding with the press in that case, Justice Burger wrote: "The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public officials-whether fair or unfair-constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment." 65 Warning of the dangers of interfering with or second-guessing journalists' exercise of editorial judgment, he continued, " [i] t has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this time. In invasion of privacy cases, lower courts have generally adopted the same stance and, when they defer to the press, have shown particular deference to editorial judgment and the editorial decision-making process. For example, in Gilbert v. Medical Economics Co., when an anesthesiologist sued a magazine over an article linking her psychiatric problems to malpractice, the Tenth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the magazine finding the topic newsworthy.
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The Tenth Circuit endorsed the district court's view that to find otherwise "would amount to 'editorial second-guessing' rather than legal analysis." 73 Similarly, in finding that reporting the identity of a rape victim was newsworthy, the Fifth Circuit in Ross v. Midwest Communications, Inc. wrote that "[e]xuberant judicial blue-pencilling after-the-fact would blunt the quills of even the most honorable journalists."
74 Judges, the court wrote, "must resist the temptation to edit journalists aggressively." 75 It added: "Reporters must have some freedom to respond to journalistic exigencies without fear that even a slight, and understandable, mistake will subject them to liability." 76 84 Set in 2014, the mockumentary tells the apocalyptic story of a future where The New York Times has become a newsletter for the "elite and elderly" and a company called "Googlezon" provides each consumer with a "one-of-a-kind news product each day based on his or her personal data." 85 The film concludes with the lament: "It didn't have to be this way." 86 Commenting on this ending, the Pew report says: "And it probably won't be."
87
The hesitancy was prescient. While today there is no Googlezon, other platforms ably play the part and do just what the fictional behemoth did: provide consumers with a personalized news product. 88 In little more than a decade there has been a seismic shift in the way that news is produced and consumed.
89
The democracy-enhancing values that have traditionally undergirded the production of news-truth, transparency, and accountability-are giving way to the consumer and profit-driven values that motivate platforms.
A. THE NEW PURVEYORS OF NEWS
Today, very few of us read the morning paper that, according to the Restatement, would tell us what is newsworthy. 90 Instead, we are glued to our phones.
91
Our phones have become the means for messaging friends, buying shoes, mapping our driving route, and finding a cup of coffee; they are also our portals to news. 92 Platforms like Facebook and Twitter are increasingly where we go to find news about our neighborhoods, nation, and world. 93 While many of us still watch cable news, local television news, and listen to broadcast news, digital 90. See MITCHELL, ET AL., supra note 5, at 4 (noting just twenty percent of Americans get their news from newspapers, down from twenty-seven percent in 2013).
91. See Pompeo, supra note 4 (noting that "everyone's reading the news on their phones").
92. See Bell, supra note 11 ("Social media hasn't just swallowed journalism, it has swallowed everything. It has swallowed political campaigns, banking systems, personal histories, the leisure industry, retail, even government and security. The phone in our pocket is our portal to the world.").
93. See Herbst, supra note 7.
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[Vol. 106:69 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL media is transforming legacy media. 94 Each week, 600 million people see a news story on Facebook.
95 And according to a recent study by the Pew Research Center, about four out of ten adults in the United States get news on Facebook and about one out of ten get it on each of Twitter and YouTube. 96 The numbers are growing, and the growth is likely to continue given that nearly half of readers below the age of thirty-five consider Facebook and Twitter to be either an important or the most important way that they get news.
97
These companies' CEOs are unabashed in expressing their ambition that their platforms will be the key place we find news in the future. Facebook's Mark Zuckerberg hopes that his company will provide the "primary news experience people have."
98 Similarly, Twitter's CEO Jack Dorsey recently told Vanity Fair, "I want people to wake up every day and the first thing they check is Twitter in order to see what's happening in the world." 99 The companies' news ambitions are evident even in the way they label themselves and their products. 
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has a "News Feed," and Twitter classifies itself as a "news" app. 100 Yet, at the same time, Facebook in particular has adamantly resisted taking on the mantle of the media. Rather, it has worked hard to present itself as little more than a conduit for its users' interests and desires. 101 For example, in the immediate aftermath of the election of Donald Trump as president, Zuckerberg scoffed at the notion that Facebook had influenced the outcome, calling it a "pretty crazy idea."
102 He also wrote: "News and media are not the primary things people do on Facebook, so I find it odd when people insist we call ourselves a news or media company."
103
In certain ways, executives like Zuckerberg are correct that platforms are not media companies. Their products differ in fundamental ways from the go-to news sources of just a few years ago. At least for now, platforms are merely publishers and distributors of news. 104 This contrasts with legacy news organizations (those pre-dating the Internet) that are generally producers and publishers and distributors of news. 105 For example, when a reader picks up The Washing- 
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[Vol. 106:69 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL ton Post or even views its website, she reads content written by reporters and editors employed by The Washington Post and published in a product that is printed and distributed by The Washington Post. In contrast, when the same reader opens the Apple News app, for example, she is using a platform that has trawled the Internet for articles, video, and other content and chosen a handful of them based on her preferences. 106 Apple News curates but does not create content.
107 Disaggregation-the way in which platforms pull and repackage content from a variety of different providers-is not unique to media. Technology has eliminated the middlemen in countless industries. 108 The effect on the media, however, has been particularly dramatic. There has been a "radical diffusion of the various particles of how we used to understand the operation of the press," says Kate Crawford, a principal researcher at Microsoft Research and a visiting professor at MIT's Center for Civil Media. 109 There are at least two reasons that the control these companies exercise is so extraordinary. One is audience. Given the vast number of people using Facebook-at least 1.5 billion worldwide-the platform has "immense power."
112
The other is advertising. While many advertisers traditionally relied on newspapers, television, and radio to reach certain audiences (primarily geographicallybased ones), they now can more effectively pinpoint consumers using the In search of the audience and revenue that once came to them, legacy news organizations are now reliant on Facebook and its brethren. 115 And now that platforms control the information pathways, they can control content. Facebook, for one, "dictates how resources are spent and what stories are told," says Julia Greenberg in Wired magazine.
116 "Facebook is setting the rules, and news organizations are following."
117 Every tweak to Facebook's algorithm sets off a new round of handwringing, soul searching, and strategizing by traditional media companies. 118 As the shift to digital and social media news sources continues, this phenomenon in newsrooms will only accelerate.
Perhaps the most impactful rule that Facebook and other platforms have set is this: the content shown to a user is the content relevant to them. According to the platforms, relevant content is the content a user wants to consume. 114. PARISER, supra note 109, at 49 ("Instead of taking out expensive advertisements in the New York Times, it was now possible to track that elite cosmopolitan readership using data acquired from [data firms]. This was, to say the least, a game changer in the business of news. Advertisers no longer needed to pay the New York Times to reach Times readers: they could target them wherever they went online. The era where you had to develop premium content to get premium audiences, in other words, was coming to a close.").
115. See Bell, supra note 11 ("Publishers are reporting that [Facebook's] Instant Articles are giving them maybe three or four times the traffic they would expect. The temptation for publishers to go 'all in' on distributed platforms, and just start creating journalism and stories that work on the social Web, is getting stronger. I can imagine we will see news companies totally abandoning production capacity, technology capacity, and even advertising departments, and delegating it all to third-party platforms in an attempt to stay afloat. This is a high-risk strategy."). Facebook in particular "has become a crucial distribution platform for publishers. Facebook has the audience news organizations are trying to reach, so they have little choice but to chase it there." Greenberg, supra note 95.
116 This commitment to relevance has often been at the direct expense of news. For example, in June 2016, in the midst of the presidential election, Facebook changed its algorithm to prioritize updates from friends and family over those posted by news outlets. 122 In the same time period, it also fired the few human editors it employed-those who oversaw its "trending topics" section. 123 A short time later, Facebook experienced a surge in "fake news"-"news articles that are intentionally and verifiably false" 124 -on the site.
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And so, in focusing on relevance to a single user, platforms have cast aside the importance of relevance to the general public or a community of readers, the very thing that has animated journalism. This schism between algorithmic and journalistic relevance is changing the concept of newsworthiness.
B. THE "LIMINAL PRESS": ALGORITHMS AND THEIR CREATORS
Underlying what appears on our screens when we open Facebook, Apple News, or Twitter is code. Code is used to construct a complex web of algorithms that work behind the scenes to determine what content we see on these sites. 126 Put simply, these algorithms are problem-solving formulas. 127 If the problem is determining what users want to read, algorithms solve that problem by processing a wealth of information about that user and making predictions based on it.
Here is a rough sketch of how it works with respect to Facebook: whenever you open the site, the algorithm examines all of the content recently posted to Facebook by your friends, those you follow, the groups you belong to, and the pages you have "liked."
128 It then assigns a relevancy score to each one of these 129 The post you see at the top of the feed has the highest relevancy score.
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Determining relevancy score is a secretive process. Reports vary wildly as to the number of variables that Facebook's algorithm uses to determine relevancy, ranging from the hundreds to 100,000. 131 These variables include what is "trending" at any given time, meaning what is being clicked on and shared by other users. 132 They also include what a user's friends are sharing. The variables account for what a reader has shown interest in previously. 133 The algorithm may well know a user's purchasing history, sexual orientation, and political affiliation. 132. See Luckerson, supra note 6 (noting Facebook's "algorithm also assumes content that has attracted a lot of engagement has wide appeal and will place it in more people's feeds").
133. These engineers, coders, and designers are now, in a sense, playing the same role as the editors sitting around the table at the Page One meeting. They are a gauntlet that content needs to run through before getting to the reader. They set the parameters that determine what gets weeded out and what is swept in. They also decide the "play"-to use a newspaper term-any particular piece of content is going to get.
Engineers, coders, and designers have assumed a societal role so similar to journalists that media sociologists have dubbed them a "liminal press." 138 Although these technology company employees "may not self-identify as journalists," say Kate Crawford and Mike Ananny, a professor at the University of Southern California's Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism, they "define the conditions under which news is created and circulated." 139 Yet, the way "news is created and circulated" in their hands is strikingly different than at a legacy news organization. In 2014, Crawford and Ananny interviewed designers, programmers, and entrepreneurs to get a sense of the "values that people were encoding" into products that distributed news.
140
Speaking at a conference held by the Tow Center for Digital Journalism, Crawford said of their results: "There was this thing we used to understand as journalistic ethics . . . . It's interesting to realize that those principles are really very different to a lot of the Silicon Valley companies that are becoming major players in this space." 141 In their interviews, Crawford said, "[b]y far and away, the biggest value was 'We just want users . . . . We just want to be the most popular app in the space. '" 142 In the study, Crawford and Ananny write that although some of their interviewees "talked about themselves in relation to press practices and tradition, many of them also distanced themselves from journalism altogether." 143 For example, when a senior news app designer was asked about the journalistic ideals that motivated him and his colleagues, he said, I don't think that the people in this space who are doing this are familiar with these ideas of journalism that you're talking about except in the most cursory In speaking at the conference, Crawford summarized that the attitude seemed to be "if somebody just wants to read news stories about marmots or the Kardashians, that's completely fine."
145 This outlook stood in contrast, she suggested, from "traditional ideas about responsibility to audience."
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Others have also documented that Silicon Valley's focus is relevancy and "engagement" (clicking on an item and spending time reading or watching it) rather than newsworthiness. In his book, The Filter Bubble, Eli Pariser recounts calling Google in 2011 to ask company officials what they thought of Google's "enormous curatorial power." 147 In response, a public relations official at the company replied: "We're just trying to give people the most relevant information."
148 And in an interview with The New York Times, the product manager for the News Feed ranking team at Facebook, Mark Marra, said "We don't want to have editorial judgment over the content that's in your feed. You've made your friends, you've connected to the pages that you want to connect to and you're the best decider for the things that you care about." 149 Thus, the driving force behind the news we consume is, more and more, not a journalist, but a formula. And the engineers, designers, and entrepreneurs behind that formula have no desire to be a Fourth Estate. As Slate's senior technology writer Will Oremus has written, while "[m]edia organizations have historically defined what matters to their audience through their own editorial judgment," Facebook engineers "have taken pains to avoid putting their own editorial stamp on the news feed."
C. NEWS JUDGMENT AND THE FOURTH ESTATE: JOURNALISM'S PERSPECTIVE
Historically, journalists have not been shy about touting the importance of their contribution to the social order. In 1929, Walter Lippmann, co-founder of the New Republic, wrote that the "task of selecting and ordering" the news from among the "incredible medley of fact, propaganda, rumor, suspicion, clues, hopes and fears" that reached the newsroom "is one of the truly sacred and priestly offices in a democracy."
151 Not to shortchange the ultimate product, he called the newspaper "the bible of democracy, the book out of which a people determines its conduct."
152 This is undoubtedly a rosy vision of the media's 153 There is also a good bit of truth to it. It is well established that journalism is a public good. 154 In economic terms, journalism "is non-rivalrous (one person's consumption of the news does not preclude another person's consumption of the same news) and non-excludable (once the news producer supplies anyone, it cannot exclude anyone)."
155 Journalism is also a public good in a more colloquial sense. Traditionally most news organizations have been driven by more than just profits. They have spent vast amounts of capital lobbying and litigating open records and First Amendment issues.
156 They have also undertaken expensive public accountability and investigative reporting and have sometimes reaped financial rewards, including improvement of the brand. 157 But more often the primary benefit has been nothing more than "the warm glow of altruism. As Lippmann did almost a century ago, many journalists speak reverently about the profession's role in promoting First Amendment ideals. They trumpet their role as facilitator of the marketplace of ideas and watchdog of government. 162 Take, for example, a former public editor for The New York Times, Margaret Sullivan, who said: "A real journalist is one who understands, at a cellular level, and doesn't shy away from, the adversarial relationship between government and press-the very tension that America's founders had in mind with the First Amendment." 163 More fundamentally, according to media experts Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel, journalists virtually uniformly see their role as a democracyenhancing one. They have written that journalism's mission can be distilled to a precept: "The primary purpose of journalism is to provide citizens with the information they need to be free and self-governing." 164 This precept has "remained consistent and enduring" despite the rise in digital-only news organizations and the broadening of the definition of journalist to include bloggers and others. 165 Kovach and Rosenstiel cite studies conducted by the Pew Research Center and developmental psychologists at Stanford, Harvard, and the University of Chicago that determined journalists shared "an adamant allegiance to a set of core standards that are striking in their commonality and in their linkage to the public information mission." 166 Journalists are not merely being self-important. A litany of legal scholars and political theorists agree that the Fourth Estate's role is central to the promotion of democracy. For example, as Robert C. Post has argued, the media provides citizens the information they need to debate the many issues being acted upon by their government, and, in facilitating this "public sphere," they "preserve the democratic legitimacy of our government." 167 161. See SCHUDSON, WHY DEMOCRACIES NEED AN UNLOVABLE PRESS, supra note 38, at 45 ("A news organization is not the simple product of writers dedicated to the search for truth. It is an endlessly volatile marriage between professional ideals and commercial ones, between the claims of factuality and the claims of story-telling, between the ambitions of analysis and the aims of entertainment.").
162. 168 As Paul Horwitz has written, "the 'old' press" is a "First Amendment institution" in that it "is identifiable and long established; it is a major part of the infrastructure of public discourse; it follows its own norms, practices, and self-regulatory standards; and it is fully (if imperfectly) capable of acting autonomously." 169 Or, as Brazilian journalist Ricardo Gandour has put it: "Journalism is a method." 170 Evidence of that method can be found in the Society of Professional Journalists' Code of Ethics. It includes four basic precepts: "seek truth and report it," "minimize harm," "act independently," and "be accountable and transparent."
171 Countless news organizations aspire to such principles, whether those principles exist in writing or are simply part of the institutional norms. 172 At The Dallas Morning News, those principles are carved right onto the stone above the building's front doors. 173 That engraving reads, in part: "Build the news upon the rock of truth and righteousness. Conduct it always upon the lines of fairness and integrity."
174
Journalists do care about relevance. In fact, they often think about their stories in terms of what they aim to provide to their audience. 175 For example, according to Tom Rosenstiel, executive director of the American Press Institute: "Some pieces are explainers. Others are just for the record to note some incremental development. Some pieces help people solve problems. Others are mutually constructive developments.' To restrict the news is therefore simultaneously to restrict the public." (footnote omitted)).
168. SCHUDSON, WHY DEMOCRACIES NEED AN UNLOVABLE PRESS, supra note 38, at 51 (describing the press as an "establishment institution" and noting that "reporters and editors operate according to a set of professional norms that are themselves constraints on expression").
169 177 Similarly, media scholar Michael Schudson has described a newspaper as "a set of editors and reporters narrating a view of what they understand to be important events to their reader, strained through the peculiar conventions of journalistic culture."
178 While Schudson says that editors and reporters take "popular expectations and tastes" into account, the newspaper shows those expectations and tastes "reflected and inflected through editorial judgment."
179 In other words, journalistic relevance isn't synonymous with audience desire.
Even the very word "news" demonstrates the way in which the Fourth Estate operates differently from an algorithm. It is not coincidental that the word "new" is incorporated in "news." The English word "news" has been around for more than five hundred years and is the plural form for "new."
180 In some sense, this very concept is at odds with relevance to the extent that relevance is aimed at providing you with more of what you already know, appreciate, or like. Put another way, journalists are trained to look for the "man bites dog" story-the story that bucks the reader's expectation. 181 Social media algorithms, in contrast, seem trained to play to those expectations.
To be sure, the press does not always comply with its own norms and conventions. Its lapses in transparency, truth, and accountability are well documented. 182 The press has also long been criticized as elitist and, as citizens have gained easy access to the pathways of information, this criticism has gotten louder. 183 The criticism has been particularly amplified in the wake of the 2016 presidential election. 184 As Pariser has written in The Filter Bubble, the "ethos" press and folks in DC were science deniers when it came to this election . . . . Even in the face of polls that showed it very close, they all said that Trump had almost no chance. It was because they couldn't imagine it happening . . . . [T] hey are in a bubble, and that bubble has just been burst.").
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[Vol. 106:69 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL of journalism has traditionally been that "[a]s newspapermen, it was their paternalistic duty to feed the citizenry a healthy diet of coverage." 185 Some have argued that under this paternalistic model the press did a poor job of providing that healthy diet. For example, Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski has said: "In the days when the media and television in particular, viewed themselves as the guardians of our virtues and sensibilities, we lost touch with who and what we really are, mesmerized instead by some fun house mirror version of reality." 186 Some have argued that the very institutional nature of the press makes it ill-positioned to critique the establishment, including government officials. 187 Yet, regardless of whether the press is elitist, or whether it is doing its job well, institutionally it has been guided by different principles than those that guide platforms, the new mediums by which news is delivered. As media and technology scholar Tarleton Gillespie has described it, competing forms of logic undergird journalism and algorithms.
188 "[E]ditorial logic," says Gillespie, "depends on the subjective choices of experts, themselves made and authorized through institutional processes of training and certification." 189 In contrast, "algorithmic logic . . . depends on the proceduralized choices of a machine, designed by human operators to automate some proxy of human judgment." 190 The differences in these principles have a powerful impact on our news ecosystem, both in terms of what content we consume and what we consider to be news.
III. THE IMPACT OF A CHANGE IN GATEKEEPER
Thus far, this Article has suggested that legacy news organizations and Silicon Valley-based platforms exist at opposing poles on a continuum. Although it is true that traditional journalistic norms are at odds with those of platforms, the platforms and their algorithms are actually forcing changes to the nature of the Fourth Estate and the news it produces. 191 192 In other words, the dominance of platforms and their algorithms as the mediums through which we get news is changing the news itself.
Until recently, consuming news involved a certain amount of serendipity. As viewers of the evening nightly newscast, we saw (and still see) stories on topics that interested us. Yet, sandwiched in between, was news on other topics that journalists deemed important but that might not otherwise have held our interest. 193 The same goes for the newspaper. When we scan the front page, we may see headlines that call out to us, but there are other stories (perhaps on disturbing or dry topics) that a group of journalists and editors deemed important. We likely read some of these stories in addition to the ones that immediately catch our eye.
Some of the serendipity and randomness to our news consumption is disappearing as algorithms customize our news.
194 Although our Facebook "friends" may point us toward things we would not have otherwise seen or read, and in their own way may serve as our "editors,"
195 often those friends share our interests and sentiments and do not present us with material that makes us uncomfortable. In fact, at least one media scholar has argued that algorithms deprioritize information that challenges us. 196 Moreover, Facebook users can choose to block content from their "friends." 193. See PABLO J. BOCZKOWSKI & EUGENIA MITCHELSTEIN, THE NEWS GAP 3 (2013) ("Through most of the twentieth century, the strong market position of the leading print and broadcast news organizations enabled them to tell the public what they thought the public needed to know, despite their perception that the public preferred something else . . . . To learn about a sporting event, a reader had to buy an entire newspaper.").
194. See Somaiya, supra note 88 ("Facebook is at the forefront of a fundamental change in how people consume journalism. Most readers now come to it not through the print editions of newspapers and magazines or their home pages online, but through social media and search engines driven by an algorithm.").
195. Eytan Bakshy, Rethinking Information Diversity in Networks, FACEBOOK (Jan. 17, 2012, 11:00 AM), https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-data-team/rethinking-information-diversity-in-networks/ 10150503499618859 [https://perma.cc/F7Y5-V8SM] (finding in a study published by Facebook that "online social networks may actually increase the spread of novel information and diverse view- The happier we are, the more likely the ads shown to us will be effective, so the algorithm prioritizes information items that are consistent with our viewpoints.").
197 
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[Vol. 106:69 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL The resulting phenomenon is known as a "filter bubble." Pariser, who coined the term, says that the filter bubble is "a unique universe of information for each of us" that has been created by "prediction engines, constantly creating and refining a theory of who you are and what you'll do and want next."
198 Editors sitting around a long table are no longer the primary curators of our news. Instead, Pariser says, "[o]ur media is a perfect reflection of our interests and desires."
199
Although the filter bubble metaphor is helpful, it provides an incomplete description of the changes that algorithms have fomented with respect to news. It accounts for the way news is sorted per our predilections: the news most "relevant" to us becomes part of our unique bubble, and everything else is left outside of it. Yet, it does not account for the way algorithms exert pressure that is changing the nature of news. That is, journalists are shaping what they report and write so that it will please the algorithms, permeate as many filter bubbles as possible, and go "viral."
200 As a report from the Tow Center for Digital Journalism stated: "Publishers are making micro-adjustments on every story to achieve a better fit or better performance on each social outlet. This inevitably changes the presentation and tone of the journalism itself." 201 This shift has been facilitated by the wide array of metrics that are now available to and used by newsrooms to chart their coverage.
202 Some newspapers used to shield their reporters from this information. As recently as 2011, The New York Times didn't provide reporters with information about how many readers were clicking on certain stories. 2017] 97 MAKING NEWS: BALANCING NEWSWORTHINESS AND PRIVACY don't let metrics dictate our assignments and play . . . because we believe readers come to us for our judgment, not the judgment of the crowd. We're not 'American Idol. '" 204 In contrast, today The New York Times uses a tool called "Stela" to give reporters and editors quick data points, including the number of page views a story is getting and how often Twitter or Facebook posts of stories have been shared or retweeted.
205 Steve Mayne, the paper's "lead growth editor" said that Stela represents something that is "part and parcel of what journalism should be: understanding your audience [and] how to reach them." 206 The New York Times is not alone. Entire companies, like Chartbeat, exist to provide analytics aimed at helping media companies "capture social momentum" and "keep 208 After analyzing approximately 40,000 stories posted on news sites based in North and South America and Western Europe, the professors found the gap to be significant 209 : "Although the news organizations disseminate news about politics, international, and economic matters, the stories that garner the most attention from the public tend to be about sports, crime, entertainment, and weather." 213 In 2015, the top "article" on The Times's website, ranked by the amount of time readers spent looking at it, was a thirty-six-question quiz designed to accelerate the intimacy between two strangers. 214 And in some instances, journalists are handing their work entirely over to a formula. The Associated Press and Los Angeles Times have been pioneers in what has been called "robot journalism" or "automated journalism" in which algorithms actually write stories. 215 The Associated Press announced in 2015 that it was automatically generating more than 3,000 stories per quarter about corporate earnings. 216 The Los Angeles Times has created "Quakebot," which utilizes data from the U.S. Geological Survey's Earthquake Notification System to automatically generate stories about earthquakes that a human editor can quickly review before publication. 217 In one instance, Quakebot resulted in the paper posting a story about a 4.4 magnitude earthquake within three minutes of its hitting Southern California.
218 Yet, as a sign that robot journalism is far from perfect, in several other instances the newspaper has published stories based on faulty data about earthquakes that never occurred. 219 Even given the control that algorithms now exert on news, it is not true that public-service journalism is dead, that all journalists are writing to affect a Twitter spike, or that algorithms are poised to take over the jobs of journalists. 220 Many journalists are still doing the type of shoe-leather journalism that Margaret Sullivan advocates. 221 In some instances, these journalists work for entities like ProPublica that have sidestepped the disruption to media's funding model by organizing as nonprofits. But they also work for legacy news organizations. As just one example, the Pulitzer Prize for investigative reporting in 2016 went to journalists from the Tampa Bay Times and Sarasota Herald-Tribune for articles and video about violence and neglect in Florida mental hospitals. 222 Yet, the viability of such watchdog journalism was in doubt even before the advent of algorithms simply because it is so expensive to produce. 223 Add the concern that such work may not be as likely to be read, and there is even more cause for concern that this brand of journalism may wither further. 224. BOCZKOWSKI & MITCHELSTEIN, supra note 193, at 5-6 ("Lack of interest in public-affairs topics may lead to a citizenry that is neither prepared nor willing to discuss these topics, and fragmentation of the audience may undermine the position of the media in the circuit of public deliberation. The gap may also be a disincentive for the leading media to perform their traditional watchdog function, by which they help to hold government officials and other large collective actors accountable. Since watchdog journalism is rarely cost effective for the organizations that undertake it, the gap may increase pressure for these organizations to reduce the resources they devote to it. That would shift the balance of power further in favor of large collective actors, to the detriment of social accountability.").
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[Vol. In the news business, newsworthiness has changed. It is no longer true, as the Restatement says, that it can be determined from "a glance at any morning paper."
226 Courts can no longer assume that editorial discretion and judgment about what to cover and how to cover it are always operating in the same way they once were. Instead, "algorithmic logic," is eclipsing "editorial logic."
227
What we are consuming as news is far more likely to be that which is "relevant" to us than what journalists sitting around a table determined was "worthy" and "legitimate." As the Tow Center report succinctly put it, "good reporting is not currently algorithmically privileged on many platforms."
228 Thus, today, it is not as self-evident as it once was that, in the words of New York's highest court, "questions of 'newsworthiness' are better left to reasonable editorial judgment and discretion."
229
Given the rift between traditional conceptions of newsworthiness and the reality of today's media landscape, there are a few options to consider. On one end of the spectrum is rejecting the newsworthiness concept altogether. Although decisive, this response is not particularly pragmatic given the entrench-225. The Case Against the Media, By the Media, supra note 214. And although this Article focuses on the changes to news that flow from the predominance of algorithms, algorithms are not the sole force changing the nature of the Fourth Estate or its product. There are numerous others that are not addressed here in detail. One is the breakdown of the traditional boundaries between business and editorial sides of a newspaper and a related increase in "native advertising"-advertising that can appear to be news content. See Ellison, supra note 160 (quoting The New York Times executive editor Dean Baquet as saying that "there was a limit to how far we could go as an institution if the people who made the journalism and the people who made the money didn't talk some"). Another is the democratization of the press through the rise of bloggers and "citizen journalists" such that it has become increasingly difficult to determine who qualifies as a journalist. See RonNell Andersen Jones, Rethinking Reporter's Privilege, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1221, 1240-41 (2013). These changes, in combination with the Fourth Estate's genuflection to algorithms, all mean that the law's rationale for protecting the press needs to evolve.
226. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS at § 652D cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 227. See Gillespie, supra note 6, at 192 (using terms "algorithmic logic" and "editorial logic" and suggesting that the former is "perhaps supplanting" the latter). 2017] 101 MAKING NEWS: BALANCING NEWSWORTHINESS AND PRIVACY ment of the public disclosure of private facts tort in the common law. 230 On the other end is the possibility of redefining newsworthiness and in so doing, narrowing its scope. Such an effort would, of course, broaden privacy protections and help to effectuate more of a balance between privacy and First Amendment interests. Yet, as will be explained in this Part, attempts to meaningfully limit the definition have proved problematic.
Instead, this Article proposes a path in between: that we shift focus away from the substance of newsworthiness and instead develop the process that courts use for analyzing it. Rather than necessarily treating newsworthiness as a question of law and quickly dismissing cases at the summary judgment or motion to dismiss stage, this Article suggests that newsworthiness only be treated as a question of law where a media defendant can make a showing that it engaged in a process for determining newsworthiness and that the publication enhances First Amendment values. If it cannot make such a showing, newsworthiness should be treated as a question of fact, and judges and juries could then take on some of the deliberation and debate that has more traditionally happened in newsrooms. This could involve employing expert witnesses and using multi-factor tests to assess newsworthiness. In this way, the judicial branch can help make up for, in some sense, the dampening of the Fourth Estate's ability to thoughtfully deliberate over what it publishes. This process would also lead to sounder justifications for deference to the press when that deference is granted.
A. BEYOND ALGORITHMS: WHY SWEEPING DEFERENCE IS NOT JUSTIFIED Before concluding that wholesale deference is not always warranted and offering an alternative, this Article pauses briefly to examine justifications that courts have, at times, invoked for deference beyond trust in the journalistic process. These include efficiency, that the First Amendment prohibits any interference with the press, and that the Fourth Estate is an institution co-equal to the courts. As described below, each of these rationales is lacking in some key respect.
First, with respect to efficiency, it is inescapable that courts will make certain determinations to manage their dockets. Efficiency is the driver behind any number of legal rules. It is, for example, at the core of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and myriad local court rules regarding motion practice and trial. 231 Yet, despite its upside, efficiency is not particularly intellectually satisfying. That is the case where the tension is so clear and the issues at stake so important as between the First Amendment and privacy.
230. See Richards & Solove, supra note 15, at 1903-04. 231. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (noting that the rules "should be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding").
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[Vol. 106:69 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL In privacy tort cases, deference has served efficiency by sparing courts the task of messy (and time-consuming) line drawing. 232 If a court can, on a dispositive motion, find that newsworthiness exists as a matter of law, the court can find for the media defendant and dispose of a case relatively quickly. At least one New York court has verified the existence of this pattern. In Gaeta v. Home Box Office, in which the cable television network aired a program showing the plaintiff's reaction to public nudity, a New York state trial court noted that "[n]early all of the reported cases" that had considered the newsworthiness exception to New York's right-of-privacy law "have been decided as a matter of law" on pre-trial motions. 233 The court concluded that "[t]his result is not surprising, given the judicial deference paid to the media's editorial judgments."
234 Yet, as the Gaeta court suggests, the effect of efficiency in privacy cases is that the plaintiff virtually always loses. Given that the efficiency almost exclusively benefits media defendants at the expense of plaintiffs, its soundness as a rationale for deference is suspect. It cannot be that efficiency alone is so important that it trumps valuing privacy claims.
Another rationale that has been invoked for deference is the suggestion that courts may not insert themselves into the editorial meeting. In other words, the editorial process is sacrosanct. For example, in Green v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc., a defamation and invasion of privacy case, a Texas federal trial court granted summary judgment to CBS when a woman and her daughter alleged an episode of 48 Hours had falsely made the mother out to be a "liar" and a "gold digger" and revealed that her daughter was a victim of a sexual assault. 235 siding with the television network the court wrote, "Defendants' editorial decisions and newsworthiness judgments concerning the content of its broadcast are not subject to review by the courts." 236 The court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Miami Herald Publishing and interpreted it to say that the First Amendment "prohibits governmental interference with the editorial decisions of the press." 237 Yet, this reading of Supreme Court precedent is flawed. The Supreme Court has not decreed that the First Amendment always trumps privacy. In fact, it has gone to pains to say that privacy is fundamental and that in some circumstances it should prevail. 238 Whether this is lip service is unclear. But if privacy torts are to survive, then it cannot be true that anytime a media entity is a defendant, the First Amendment outweighs privacy and deference to the media defendant is warranted. In such a situation, the newsworthiness exception would "swallow the tort."
239 And so, to the extent that courts blindly follow authority to find that the press must win, either because it always has or the First Amendment mandates it, this rationale for deference should also fail.
Finally, deference to the press as a co-equal institution is also unsurprising given the long tradition of judicial deference to the institution most capable of a certain task. It is, in a sense, a close cousin of the efficiency rationale. The entity that has the best knowledge will act faster and better. This tenet underlies, for example, the standard of review in appellate cases 240 and Chevron deference in 236. Id. at *7. This statement by the court was made in reasoning through the mother's defamation claim. The court granted the motion for summary judgment as to invasion of privacy finding that the daughter having been a victim of a sex crime was "generally known to many." Id. at *11. 237. Id. Less emphatic, but still highly wary of questioning the press, the California Supreme Court in Shulman indicated deference helped in "avoiding the likelihood of unconstitutional interference with freedom of the press to report truthfully on matters of legitimate public interest." Shulman, 955 P.2d at 484-86. While the court acknowledged that in "extreme" cases deference might not be warranted, it seemed that for all intents and purposes, the press was free to print what it pleased as long as it was truthful. Id. at 485, 497. To exercise a "supervisory power over the press" would be, in the court's words, "impermissible." Id. "The courts do not, and constitutionally could not, sit as superior editors of the press," it said. 240. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) ("Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the witnesses' credibility."); Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985) . Typically, appellate courts defer to trial courts on findings of fact because the trial courts often heard witnesses and examined evidence firsthand. Id. at 575 ("When findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, Rule 52(a) demands even greater deference to the trial court's findings; for only the trial judge can be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener's understanding of and belief in what is said."). It is assumed that the lower court's knowledge of the facts is better and that assumption is formalized in a rule. See id. In contrast, appellate courts review de novo issues of law based on the assumption that, as the 104 [Vol. 106:69 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL the administrative law realm. 241 And it is not unheard of for a court to defer to the expertise of private entities when it believes a business or institution may be better placed to make a decision. 242 Yet, for the reasons described in Parts II and III, given the changes to the way news is created and distributed, it is no longer clear that the courts should be quick to assume that a media defendant is engaging in a traditional editorial process and, as a result, readily defer to the Fourth Estate.
And so, there are numerous reasons why the courts have historically exercised deference to the press in privacy cases. Yet today, none of the rationales outlined provides a particularly sound basis for deference.
B. SALVAGING NEWSWORTHINESS: A DEFINITIONAL APPROACH
The ongoing changes in the media industry have already been so dramatic that there is some reason to think that, in the age of algorithms, newsworthiness has become an unworkable concept. Warren, Brandeis, and Prosser likely never envisioned that formulas rather than professional journalists would be deciding what qualified as "news." Even before the Internet upended the media world, scholars questioned the doctrinal soundness of newsworthiness because of the near impossibility of coming up with a workable definition. 243 For example, Diane L. Zimmerman wrote more than thirty years ago that "the process of defining 'newsworthy' information has practically destroyed the private-facts tort as a realistic source of a legal remedy."
244 She argued that the difficulties of the concept were so inescapable, and the consequences of an unbridled definition so pernicious, that "preservation of even a small corner of the Warren-Brandeis tort" was not worth the risk. 245 More recently, Neil M. Richards has argued that newsworthiness has been conceived of so broadly that the hurdles to finding liability against any media defendant-much less any 241. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) ("We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle of deference to administrative interpretations." (footnote omitted)). Similarly, courts grant "substantial deference" to prison administrators' judgments regarding the appropriateness of prison regulations. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003) ("We must accord substantial deference to the professional judgment of prison administrators, who bear a significant responsibility for defining the legitimate goals of a corrections system and for determining the most appropriate means to accomplish them.").
242. 246 Richards has concluded that the public disclosure of private facts tort is "largely unconstitutional" and suggests abandoning it in favor of other causes of action, such as trespass and breach of confidence, that may better protect privacy interests. 247 These arguments have even more force today. If anything, the problems that Zimmerman and Richards chronicled have only worsened as algorithms increasingly impact the generation and distribution of news. As noted earlier, the Restatement's conception of newsworthiness as applying to virtually everything the press publishes is based on an understanding that the press is acting with deliberation and discretion. Yet, today's press is being pushed by algorithms to prioritize interest over importance and "relevance" above all else. It is ever more likely that "news" is what benefits the media's bottom line instead of what promotes First Amendment values. Yet, given how entrenched the public disclosure of private facts tort has become in common law and statute, it is highly unlikely courts will simply abandon it.
248
In light of the sticking power of the tort, others have worked to try to salvage the newsworthiness test. They have returned to the project (begun by Warren and Brandeis and continued by Prosser) of trying to define the term. 249 In one particularly compelling effort, Amy Gajda proposes rethinking the disclosure tort to provide a presumption of newsworthiness that is only overcome "in truly exceptional cases, when the degradation of human dignity caused by the disclosure clearly outweighs the public's interest in the disclosure."
250 Such a test, through its presumption, helps to address courts' concern that they not sit as super-editors. It also leaves open the possibility that the presumption can be overcome. According to Gajda, the concept of "human dignity" avoids "pitfalls from an overbroad definition for newsworthiness." 251 Yet, there are potentially two problems with the test. 252 First, it is unclear whether it would only apply to the media. 253 If it did only apply to media, that would mean different defendants would be subject to different standards, which 252. Gajda herself notes another potential problem, which is that an "excessive focus on dignity to the seeming exclusion of information of public interest" has led some European Union nations to be "willing to give their citizens a right to control information about themselves." Id. at 235 (footnote omitted).
253. Gajda suggests it would apply only to the media when she writes that the definition "attempts to give news media support in close cases through a strong presumption of newsworthiness." Id. at 233. Yet, it is possible given technology that a private fact could be published and distributed widely by a single person or a nonmedia actor. And so, it also seems possible that defendants other than media entities would invoke the newsworthiness defense.
In fairness, picking apart tests is far easier than devising them. It can be argued that any test is doomed to fail given the need for elasticity in the definition of newsworthiness that Warren and Brandeis spoke of in 1890. 263 Any definition is just that, a definition, fixed and static. And newsworthiness, due to its slipperiness and ever-changing nature, may elude definition. Perhaps this is why, as Diane L. Zimmerman has argued, virtually all newly devised tests have fallen short.
C. TOWARDS NEW PROCESSES FOR DETERMINING NEWSWORTHINESS
Given the maddening nature of newsworthiness-that the concept is entrenched in the law and yet impossible to pin down-it may be futile to continue trying to define it in a fixed and immutable way. Rather than focusing on the substance of newsworthiness, energy may be better spent developing the processes courts use to assess newsworthiness. It is the journalistic process of assessing newsworthiness that is being weakened as algorithms exercise more control over the media, and it is that process on which many courts have relied in deferring to the media. Although no legal process can supplant the editorial one (judges and juries are not reporters and editors, and do not have the same expertise), we can attempt to ensure that careful deliberation occurs in the litigation process as it has traditionally occurred in newsrooms. This would be an improvement over the reflexive deference that has characterized the courts' decision making in this arena. To be sure, this proposal is not aimed at decreasing the number of cases in which deference is granted to the press, although this would likely be the result. Rather, its goal is to provide a more principled basis for the outcome of a case, whatever that outcome may be.
As noted in Part I, courts often like to resolve public disclosure of private facts causes of action as early on in the life of a case as possible. 265 For example, the California Supreme Court called summary judgment a "favored remedy" because "unnecessarily protracted litigation would have a chilling effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights." 266 This might be the right outcome if only First Amendment rights were at stake, but in disclosure of private facts cases, privacy is also at play. In these instances, not only does the need to dispose of cases not seem pressing, but the difficulty of drawing the line to the media defendant in the case given that the media had such a limited role in the harm and perhaps did not exercise its discretion regarding newsworthiness beyond publishing the column.
263. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 21, at 216. 264. Zimmerman, supra note 234, at 355 ("Although we might not wish to leave the determination of newsworthiness to the unregulated judgment of publishers, the absence of any other sensible test may dictate a continuation of the practice. Courts' efforts to devise a better standard have met with little success." (footnote omitted)).
265. Id. at 293 n.5 ("In a survey of state case law [regarding public disclosure of private facts], the author found fewer than 18 cases in which a plaintiff was either awarded damages or found to have stated a cause of action sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment or a motion to dismiss.").
266. See Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 487 (Cal. 1998).
